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I n reflecting on the arc of US and coalition detention operations in Afghanistan, three key issues related to the law of armed conflict stand out: one substantive, 
one procedural and one policy. The substantive matter-what are the minimum 
baseline treatment standards required as a matter of international law?-has clari-
fied significantly during the course of operations there, largely as a result of the US 
Supreme Court's holding in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.
' 
The procedural matter-what 
adjudicative processes does international law require for determining who may be 
detained?---eludes consensus and has become morc controversial the longer the 
Afghan conllict has continued. And the policy matter-in waging counterinsur-
gency warfare, how do foreign mili tary fo rces transition military detention opera-
tions to effective civilian institutions?-has emerged as a critical strategic priority 
for which the law of armed conflict provides little instructive guidance. 
President Barack Obama's determination to close Guantanamo while expand-
ing US military commitments in Afghanistan will draw new public attention to 
these questions. After briefly explaining the basis of US and coalition detention op-
erations, this article addresses each of these issues in turn. Viewing them together, 
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it concludes with some general observations about the convergence of law and 
strategy. 
us and Coalition Detention Operations in Operation Enduring Freedom 
In late 2001, the United States launched operations in Afghanistan, and almost im-
mediately began capturing and holding suspected enemy figh ters. The US legal au-
thority for detention operations in Afghanistan began from the propositions that 
[tJhe United States and its coalition partners are engaged in a war against al-Qaida, the 
Taliban, and their affiliates and supporters. There is no question that under the law of 
armed conflict, the United States has the authority to detain persons who have engaged 
in unlawful belligerence until the cessation of hostilities. Like other wafS, when they 
start we do not know when they will end. Still, we may detain combatants until the end 
ofthewar.2 
Although many US allies participated in military operations, US forces took the 
lead in conducting detention operations in Afghanistan ,3 eventually consolidating 
theater detention operations at Bagram air force base facili ties. 
As explained by a commander of US detention forces in Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF), " [ d I uring the execution of this campaign, the U.S. Armed Forces 
and allied forces have captured or procured the surrender of thousands of individ-
uals believed to be members or supporters of either al Qaeda or the Taliban."4 
Detentions were intended to 
[prevent] them from returning to the battlefield and engaging in further armed attacks 
against innocent civilians and U.S. and coalition forces. Detention also serves as a 
deterrent against future attacks by denying the enemy the fighters needed to conduct 
war. Interrogations during detention enable the United States to gather important 
intelligence to prevent future attacks.5 
Nearly eight years after the initial invasion, US detention operations go on, and the US 
military is modernizing its facilities in the expectation of their further continuation.6 
In some respects US and coalition detention operations in Afghanistan are a 
valuable case study for examining contemporary application of the law of armed 
conflict . Aside from the thousands of individual detentions, the "data" include 
publicly released and declassified documents of internal US government legal and 
policy decision-making, as well as li tigation that has pushed the US government to 
clarify its legal positions and has produced judicial interpretations of the law of 
armed conflict. 
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In other respects, however, it is difficult to examine the law of armed conflict in 
the Afghanistan setting because of some peculiar aspects of detention operations 
there. First, most US allies participating in coalition operations in Afghanistan 
have done so not as part of anti-Taliban and anti-al Qaida combat operations (Op-
eration Enduring Freedom) but as part of the International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF). The latter, which assists the Afghan government in maintaining se-
curity in certain parts of the country, is authorized by a series of Chapter VII UN 
Security Council resolutions that authorize participating contingents to "take all 
necessary measures to fulfil its mandate."? Participating military forces therefore 
derive authority to detain certain captured militants from this UN Security Coun-
cil mandate independent of the law of armed conflict. Second, US allies participat-
ing in both OEF and ISAF have almost entirely "opted out" of detention 
operations. In 2005, NATO adopted guidelines, which the European partners fol-
low, calling for transferring detainees to the Afghan government within ninety-six 
hours of capture.8 As explained further below, this has meant that US detentions 
form the only significant body of State practice in Afghanistan to measure against 
or help interpret the law of armed conflict related to detention. 
Detention Treatmen t Standards 
In the early phases of military operations in Afghanistan, but especially after the 
Abu Ghraib crisis in Iraq, followed by exposure of detainee abuses in Afghanistan 
and Guantanamo, the most intense public controversy focused on the issue of 
treatment standards. Much of this debate centered on the appropriate classifica-
tion of captured Taliban and al Qaida fighters , because most protagonists in this 
debate believed that the appropriate treatment baseline turned in part on captured 
individuals' legal statuses.9 
Shortly before conventional combat operations began, US military command-
ers in charge of Afghanistan operations issued an order instructing that the Geneva 
Conventions were to be applied to all captured individuals. Belligerents would be 
screened according to standard doctrine to determine whether or not they were en-
titled to prisoner of war status. IO This was consistent with existing military regula-
tions and recent US military practice. 
On February 7, 2002, however, the President determined that Taliban and al 
Qaida detainees were "unlawful combatants, "II and therefore protected by neither 
the custodial standards of the Third Geneva Convention applicable to prisoners of 
war nor Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.12 Prisoner of war 
protections did not cover al Qaida detainees because al Qaida was not a "High Con-
tracting Party" to the Conventions, and they did not cover Taliban because those 
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forces failed the tests of Article 4 of the Third Convention, which stipulates require-
ments for legitimate military forces.I3 Common Article 3 did not apply, by its own 
terms, because this was believed to be an international armed conflict, whereas Com-
mon Article 3 rules apply in conflicts "not of an international character."14 
The President further directed in his February 2002 instructions, however, that 
"[als a matter of policy, the United States Armed Forces shall continue to treat de-
tainees hwnanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military ne-
cessity, in a manner consistent with the principles ofGeneva."15 While ostensibly 
protective, this directive also opened holes in the law of armed conflict's barriers. 
First, it applied by its terms only to armed forces, hinting that intelligence services 
might not be similarly constrained. Second, by emphasizing humane treatment as 
a matter of policy, it suggested that humane treatment was not required as a matter 
oflaw. And, third , it suggested that the Geneva Conventions' principles could val-
idly be compromised in pursuit of security requirements. 
Well known is the stonn of criticism that erupted over the initial US govern-
ment position that the Geneva Conventions-and, preswnably, customary law of 
armed conflict-provided no legal guarantee of minimum treatment standards for 
enemy combatants captured in OEF. Many critics have attributed detainee abuses 
in Afghanistan to these foundational legal decisions. Critics of the US position con-
sistently rejected the notion that unlawful combatants fall intoa "legal gap" in pro-
tection. They asserted a range of alternatives, including that captured fighters (at 
least Taliban) were entitled to prisoner of war status; that all captured fighters are 
entitled at least to minimum protections of Common Article 3, Article 75 of the 
first Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions,l6 and the customary law of 
armed conflict; and/or that any detainees are protected by international h wnan 
rights law, including prohibitions on "cruel, inhuman and degrading" treatment.17 
In June 2006 the US Supreme Court resolved much of this debate, at least as a 
matter of international law incorporated into US law. It held in Hamdan v. 
Rllmsfeld, a petition brought by a Yemeni detained during OEF and transferred to 
Guantanamo, that Common Article 3 affords minimal protections to individuals 
captured within the territory of a signatory but engaged in a conflict not between 
two nations. This would include not only civil wars (as Common Article 3 is more 
traditionally understood) but also conflicts with transnational actors like al 
Qaida. 18 Soon after, on July 7, 2006, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed that 
"all DoD personnel adhere to [Common Article 31 standards" and that each de-
partment component "review all relevant directives, regulations, policies, prac-
tices, and procedures . .. to ensure that they comply with [theml ."1 9 
Hamdan's holding that Common Article 3's minimum treatment standards 
apply to enemy combatants captured in Afghanistan significantly narrowed the 
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scope of controversy over international legal constraints on US detention opera-
tions. Common Article 3 demands that detainees " in all circumstances be treated 
humanely," and it prohibits, among other things, "cruel treatment and torture" as 
well as "outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading 
treatment ."20 Although vague, these provisions contain basic care and custody re-
quirements that match closely the basic treatment standards of human rights law 
that some critics argued applied. While not matching the enhanced protections af-
forded prisoners of war, this holding nevertheless answered the criticism of those 
critics who argued that the Geneva Conventions contain no "gaps" in their cover-
age of individuals detained in armed conflict. Perhaps most important, this hold-
ing clarified that these minimwn treatment standards apply as a matter of treaty 
law of armed conflict, not merely policy. 
Detention Adjudicatory Process 
The Hamdan holding helped clarify the minimal treatment standards applicable to 
OEF detention operations in Afghanistan, but the sparse tenns of Common Article 3 
do little to clarify the separate issue of what minimum procedural requirements 
govern decisions to detain or continue to detain individuals in Afghanistan.21 Proce-
dural mechanisms for reviewing detention decisions in Afghanistan have received 
remarkably little public scrutiny compared with those at Guantanamo, even though 
in many respects-at least as initially characterized by the US government- the de-
tainees in both are similarly situated. Thus far the war in Afghanistan does more to 
highlight the difficult issue of procedural safeguards in the law of armed conflict 
than it does to answer it. 
In the early phases of OEF operations in Afghanistan, much of the legal debate 
about procedural detention issues focused on Article 5 of the Third Geneva Con-
vention, the Prisoner of War Convention. It provides that "[sJhould any doubt 
arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and having fallen 
into the hands of the enemy," qualify as prisoners of war, "such persons shall enjoy 
the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has been 
determined by a competent tribunal."22 Then, as now, however, little State practice 
or detailed authoritative commentary existed interpreting these terms. US mili tary 
regulations previously called for a three-officer panel that would take testimony 
from reasonably available witnesses, including the detainee, and make judgments. 2J 
And US military forces were preparing to conduct such tribunals for individuals 
captured in Afghanistan until they were directed otherwise, eventually by the Presi-
dent's February 7, 2002 legal determinations which rendered any captured Taliban 
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and al Qaida fighters "unlawful combatants" as a matter of law; hence there was 
not "any doubt" as to their status for Article 5 tribunals to adjudicate.24 
Many critics contested this claim, arguing that Article 5 requires case-by-case 
determinations; that group designations of this sort are impermissible.25 Others 
have argued that this provision means that when there is doubt whether a captured 
individual is even an enemy fighter or not, he is entitled to a hearing before a tribu-
nal; therefore, the argument goes, suspected aI Qaida and Taliban combatants in 
US custody should have been entitled upon capture to such review.26 Article 5's 
language begins with the notion that a subject detainee has "committed a belliger-
ent act," suggesting that the drafters intended to mandate minimum procedures 
for resolving factual doubt as to a subject's type of combatant or beUigerent act, not 
the prior question whether he is or is not a combatant. But in practice any process 
to adjudicate an individual's type of combatancy, and hence the Geneva protec-
tions to which he is entitled, would likely uncover some cases of mistaken identity 
or othenvise erroneous detentions.27 
Regardless of its precise meaning, it is quite clear that Article 5 was drafted with 
very different circwnstances in mind from those of the Afghanistan conflict. In 
particular, it was intended for a conflict pitting professional armies and oflimited 
duration. 211 A relatively simple front-end adjudicato!), review was sufficient in such 
conflicts because sorting combatants from noncombatants (for detention purposes) 
was relatively easy and conflicts would likely end within a few months or years, 
whereupon any remaining captives would be released. Afghanistan, by contrast, 
involves a set of conflicts already lasting almost eight years and likely to continue 
many more, and an enemy force (especially al Qaida forces, but also residual 
Taliban) that routinely obscures its identity among civilian populations.2" 
In contexts such as this, the more important issue than appropriate front-end 
status screening is to what form of review (and perhaps adversarial process) are de-
tainees entitled to contest the factual basis of their detention, given the relatively 
high probability and cost of errors. Three main positions have emerged, though 
there are many sub-positions within each. 
The US government has generally taken the position that the law of armed con-
flict is the exclusive body of international law dictating procedural constraints on 
detention of captured fighters in Afghanistan. This position assumes the continued 
existence of anned conflict (in the US view, it remains an international armed con-
fli ct, though Hamdan at least adds new questions to this view), and that the law of 
armed conflict operates as lex spedalis, displacing othenvise applicable legal 
norms.30 Beyond consistently arguing against the reach of judicial habeas corpus 
protections to Afghanistan,31 however, the US government has not articulated any 
clear procedural mandates imposed by the law of armed conflict for sorting out 
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who is or is not a combatant. Instead it has sought to maintain flexibility. adopting 
procedural protections as a matter of policy. 
Some human rights organizations have argued that. especially since the estab-
lishment of the new Afghan government following the 2002 Loya Jirga. interna-
tional human rights law. not the law of armed conflict. governs procedural 
protections. along with Afghan domestic law.32 This view generally assumes that 
the war in Afghanistan evolved at that time fro m an international armed conflict to 
an internal armed conflict and that the law of armed conflict provides no inde-
pendent authorization for detention in the latter category. Holders of this view 
look to. among other sources. the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. which states: 
No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with 
such procedure as are established by law . ... Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by 
arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that that 
court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release 
if the detention is not lawful. H 
Under the strictest form of this view. any long-term detention of suspected Taliban 
or al Qaida fighters in Afghanistan requires criminal trial with universally recognized 
due process safeguards-a standard that leaves US practice in Afghanistan falling 
far short.34 
A third view holds that neither the law of armed conflict nor human rights treaty 
law provides sufficiently dear or comprehensive procedural safeguards to persons 
detained for security reasons. The International Committee of the Red Cross 
(JCRe) has developed a set of principles and safeguards that it argues should gov-
ern security detention in all circumstances. Le., both in armed conflicts and outside 
of them. The guidelines are based on lawof armed conflict and human rights treaty 
rules. as well as on non-binding standards and best practice. and are to be inter-
preted on a case-by-case basis. According to the JCRC guidelines. detainees are 
entitled-among other things-to challenge the lawfulness of their detention and 
to have an independent and impartial body decide on continued detention or re-
lease.35 The JCRC considers that Afghanistan is a situation of non-international 
armed conflict: it would argue that detainees in US or other international-force 
hands should enjoy far more robust procedural rights than currently afforded and 
that detainees in Afghan custody should be granted judicial review.36 
Experience in Afghanistan offers intuitive support for the third approach. but 
it does little to resolve the difficult issue of exactly which international human 
rights law provisions should apply. The fact that the nature of fighting there--
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against an enemy that deliberately obscures its identity and moves in and out of 
local communities-<reates a high likelihood of some erroneous, long-term 
detentions supports the call for thorough screening proceduresY But combat 
conditions, resource constraints and the weak state of Afghan justice would com-
plicate efforts to establish formal judicial mechanisms by either coalition or the 
Afghan governments.38 
Meanwhile, the US Supreme Court recently held in Boumedietle v. Bus}, that en-
emy combatants at Guantanamo are entitled to constitutional habeas corpus 
rights.39 The issue of Boumediene's reach beyond Guantanamo, especially to Af-
ghanistan, will be litigated for some time, and that case turned on interpretation 
and application of US domestic law. In any event, the Supreme Court did not clar-
ify exactly what procedural structures and protections apply even in habeas cases 
for Guantanamo detainees, and the Court seemed to have Afghanistan in mind 
when it cautiously suggested that practical considerations and exigencies of foreign 
combat zones might limit the reach of constitutional habeas rights to enemy com -
batant detainees held outside Guantanamo.40 
Legal requirements aside, US forces have gradually instituted more formalized 
procedural mechanisms for adjudicating detention decisions as time has gone on. 
The little detail on review processes in Afghanistan shared openly by the US gov-
ernment appears mostly in court filings in habeas corpus actions brought by 
Bagram detainees. These public documents explain that by 2006 all individuals 
brought to theater dctention facilities for long-term confincment have their cases 
reviewed by a five-officer panel, sitting as an Enemy Combatant Review Board, 
usually within sevcnty-five days of capture and thereafter cverysix months. The re-
vicw board may recommend by a majority vote to the commanding general or his 
designee whether the individual should continue to be detained.41 Although the US 
government maintains that the Fourth Geneva Convention is inapplicable as a 
matter oflaw to Afghanistan dctainees because that Convention applies to civil-
ians, not combatants, the processes US forces eventually put in place roughly track 
the requirements of Article 78, which calls for, among other things, regular pro-
cesses and periodic review (at least every six months) for security internees.42 
So far, the Afghanistan case has produced li ttle legal consensus on minimum 
procedural requirements in part because the spectrwn of views spans differing 
judgments on such basic questions as what type of conflict exists (international 
versus internal), what body of law applies (law of armed conflict versus human 
rights law versus domestic Afghan law, or some combination ) and what specific 
minimum requirements those bodies oflaw impose (mandatory provisions versus 
a sliding scale depending on practicability). Meanwhile, US forces have adopted in-
creasingly robust processes for adjudicating cases, suggesting at least some-
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though still far from complete--<onvergence between the aspirations of restrictive 
legal views and the pragmatic and ethical inclinations of those charged with waging 
the conflict. 
Transitioning Detention Operations to Local Civilian Institutions 
A final issue to consider is the transition from a military detention to a civilian 
justice system in Afghanistan . Unlike the substantive and procedural issues dis-
cussed above, this is not a law of armed conflict issue in a strict sense (except for 
Geneva Convention rules governing repatriation). But it is entwined with the other 
legal issues, and the strategic necessity of resolving it effectively may impact the fu-
ture development of the law of armed conflict. 
The law of armed conflict is generally designed to minimize unnecessary suffer-
ing in wartime and to facilitate a return to peace and public order. In the context of 
conventional warfare, the law of armed conflict's detention authorities and rules 
generally serve well these goals: until order is restored through victory or settle-
ment of the conflict they allow-with sparse procedural requirements compared 
to peacetime justice systems-the incapacitation of captured individuals pre-
sumed (or assessed) likely to fight again if released and they protect those individu-
als from mistreatment. For the most part, the rules align with the law's policy 
objectives, including the strategic necessities of detention during combat. 
US detention operations have taken place in Afghanistan amid a more complex 
strategic environment. Operations have evolved to include a major counterinsur-
gency component against Taliban and al Qaeda forces conducting guerrilla-style 
and terrorist operations aimed to undermine the new Afghan government. Of 
course, the role and rules of detention in counterinsurgency conflicts are not new 
problems or unique problems. One aspect that distinguishes the Afghanistan case, 
however, is the weakness or nascent condition of State institutions, including law 
and order systems, which needed to be almost completely reconstituted aftercoali-
tion and Afghan forces overthrew the Taliban in 2001. Indeed, the collapse or 
weakness of governance in many parts of the country and the inability of the State 
to provide basic State services like policing and criminal justice create an environ-
ment hospitable to insurgent forces .43 Moreover, the Afghan government lacks ef-
fective institutions of governance, including a police and justice sector capable of 
maintaining order. This is not just a counterinsurgency campaign to save a mature 
government; it is a counterinsurgency campaign while building a new government 
in a region long accustomed to internal strife and warlordism. 
Amid this setting, a 2004 Pentagon inspection and assessment of US detention 
operations in Afghanistan concluded that "US detainee operations can only be 
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normalized by the emergence of an Afghan justice and corrections system that can 
assume the responsibility for the long-term detention oflow level enemy combat-
ants currently held by the US."44 The report continued: 
The value of continuing to keep low-level enemy combatants in custody is simply to 
keep individuals that represent a proven threat to coalition forces off the battlefield. 
This is a function that can and should be undertaken by the Afghan government . . . . 
Despite efforts to improve the process, the press of a growing detainee population 
without an Afghan solution or continued transfer to [Guantanamol will continue to 
create the potential fo r bad choices to be made at several points in that process.4S 
In 2005 the governments of the United States and Afghanistan reached 
diplomatic agreements to "allow for the gradual transfer of Afghan detainees to the 
exclusive custody and control of the Afghan Govemment."46 But this gradual tran-
sition has been slowed since then by the shakiness of Afghan security institutions 
and inability to install domestic legal authorities and processes capable of handling 
or prosecuting captured militants.47 
These factors raise several policy questions onto wh ich the law of armed conflict 
no longer maps so neatly: Does the long-term reliance on foreign military deten-
tion strengthen versus deplete or build versus undermine public confidence in do-
mestic civilian justice institutions? As coalition forces tum over more and more 
security and governance functions to Afghan authorities, how should responsibil-
ity for detaining militants, including those already in custody, be transferred? 
Many features of this conflict are unique to Afghanistan, but these basic problems 
resemble those faced in Iraq and could likely recur in other areas where governance 
collapses, such as Somalia. 
One lesson that the US mili tary appears to have drawn in Afghanistan, as well as 
in Iraq, is the strategic imperative of high substantive and procedural standards of 
detainee treatment, especially when seeking to bolster rule-of-Iaw institutions.48 
The new Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual emphasizes this 
principle, not only for legal and ethical reasons, but also for military effectiveness.49 
After noting, for example, that the "nature of [counterinsurgency] operations 
sometimes makes it difficult to separate potential detainees from innocent by-
standers, since insurgents lack distinctive uniforms and deliberately mingle with 
the local populace,"50 the manual goes on to warn that "treating a civilian like an 
insurgent is a sure recipe for failure ."SJ It continues: 
[Counterinsurgency] operations strive to restore order, the rule of law, and civil 
procedures to the authority of the [host nation] government . ... Multinational and 
U.S. forces brought in to support this objective must remember that the populace will 
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scrutinize their actions. People will watch to see if Soldiers and Marines stay consistent 
with this avowed purpose. Inconsistent actions furnish insurgents with valuable issues 
for manipulation and propaganda.52 
Although the law of armed conflict has little to say directly on the issue of transfer-
ring detention responsibilities from military to civilian systems, the substantive 
and procedural legal issues described earlier affect this transition process insofar as 
adherence to their standards helps lay a foundation of support and legitimacy upon 
which local rule oflaw can be built. 
Conclusion 
The operational and strategic significance of detention standards imply several 
conclusions about the future development and refinement of the law of armed 
conflict, returning the discussion to the legal controversies discussed earlier. As to 
substantive treatment standards, the strategic rationale is likely to reinforce 
strongly the idea of universally applicable minimum requirements, despite initial 
efforts by the Bush administration to reserve greater flexibility. As to procedural re-
quirements, in thinking about the future trajectory of the law of armed conflict (or 
the application of human rights law in armed conflict), the more that rule-of-law 
promotion features as a strategic objective, the more robust procedural protections 
for detainees will align with military necessity, rather than collide with it. 
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